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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOO 
ALICIA LARSON : Case No. 930550-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : District Court No. 10958 
MARC LARSON, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : Priority 4 
0O0 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANTS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders of the 
District Courts of the State of Utah pursuant to §78-2-2, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in 
modifying the Decree of Divorce to automatically transfer physical 
care and custody of the parties1 three minor children to 
respondent, Marc Larson, if appellant, Alicia Larson, does not 
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reside in Summit County, Utah, thereby failing to allow her to 
relocate with the children? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to award 
appellant her attorney's fees and costs in defending respondent's 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce? 
3. Should appellant be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal? 
The standard of review with regard to the issues of child 
custody is whether the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings is so lacking as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 
P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). The standard of review with regard to 
the issues of attorney's fees is whether they are reasonable, 
needed by the recipient and able to be paid by the other party. 
Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action to modify the child custody and 
visitation provisions of a Decree of Divorce by changing physical 
custody of the parties' three minor children to the non-custodial 
parent in the event their primary physical custodian relocates from 
Summit County, Utah. 
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B. Course of the Proceedings, 
Defendant/petitioner/appellee, Marc S. Larson 
(hereinafter "Marc"), filed his Verified Petition for Modification 
of Decree of Divorce herein on November 6, 1992. (R-76). The case 
was tried on April 15, 1993, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, before the Honorable David 
S. Young, judge presiding. The court made its bench ruling at the 
conclusion of trial on April 15, 1993. Marc subsequently prepared 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, to which appellant timely filed her 
Objection on July 12, 1993. This Objection was denied by the trial 
court, which thereafter entered the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce on 
July 26, 1993. It is from these Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce that the 
plaintiff/respondent/appellant, Alicia Larson (hereinafter 
"Alicia"), now appeals. Alicia timely filed her Notice of Appeal 
on August 24, 1993. 
C. Disposition in Court Below. 
The trial court granted Marc's Petition for Modification 
of Decree of Divorce, in ordering that the parties should maintain 
joint legal custody of their minor children, with Alicia to 
continue as their primary physical custodian subject to Marc's 
visitation so long as she resides in Summit County, Utah, but if 
she leaves Summit County, Utah, then physical custody of the 
children would automatically transfer to Marc subject to Alicia's 
3 
reasonable rights of visitation. Each party was ordered to bear 
his or her own attorney's fees and costs, 
D. Statement of Facts, 
Alicia and Marc Larson were divorced on April 29, 1992, 
following a marriage of approximately ten years. (R-56, 65) . They 
have three minor children, Brandi, born May 26, 1984, April, born 
July 20, 1985, and Angie, born October 14, 1987. (R-66). At the 
time of the divorce, Alicia was a homemaker and not otherwise 
employed outside the home. Marc was a self-employed as a physical 
therapist and owner of his own therapy business. (R-58). The 
Decree of Divorce reached by stipulation of the parties provides, 
in part, that: 
(a) The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of 
the three minor children. The plaintiff was awarded the primary 
physical care, custody and control of the children and the primary 
residence of the children was designated with the plaintiff subject 
to defendant's right to have the children during reasonable and 
liberal times and places to include approximately two and one-half 
weekends each month, summer visits and holiday visits. 
The parties were to cooperate in fostering one 
another's relationship and parental role with the children, inform 
one another of important issues in the children's lives to allow 
for joint decision-making in the children's upbringing. In the 
event of any disagreement, the parties agreed to first attempt 
resolution through mediation. 
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Each party was to give the other a minimum of thirty 
days advance written notice prior to relocating from Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
(b) Marc was ordered to pay child support to Alicia in 
the total amount of $2,400 per month for the minor children. 
(c) Marc was ordered to pay Alicia $3,000 per month as 
alimony for a period of five years. 
(d) An equitable distribution was ordered, which 
includes a property settlement from Marc to Alicia in the sum of 
approximately $86,500 due in April 1997. (R-66, 67, 68, 71). 
The parties and their minor children had lived in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah, since 1989. Alicia and the children 
continued to reside together in Park City following entry of the 
Decree of Divorce as did Marc in a separate home. (T-9, 67). In 
the summer of 1992 while attending a workshop in Oregon to help 
advance her experience and training in her art field, Alicia met 
Mr. Pomeroy, who was an instructor in one of her classes. (T-71). 
Alicia and Mr. Pomeroy fell in love and made plans to marry and 
thereafter live with the parties' minor children in Corvallis, 
Oregon, where Mr. Pomeroy had a home and art studio. (T-71-72). 
In October 1992 as her marriage plans evolved, Alicia notified Marc 
of her intended move to Corvallis, Oregon, with the children. (T-
19; Exhibit 1). Marc thereafter filed his Verified Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce on November 6, 1992, requesting, 
among other things, that the divorce be amended to award him 
physical custody of the parties1 three minor children if they were 
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unable to reach agreement on issues of child custody and 
visitation. (R-76-81). Alicia then changed her original plans to 
move to Oregon with the children in December 1992 to June 1993 in 
hopes of making the move more acceptable to Marc, and to do so at 
a time when it would be easiest for the children in their 
schooling. (T-82-83). 
By the time of trial on Marc's Petition for Modification 
of Decree of Divorce on April 15, 1993, Alicia and Mr. Pomeroy had 
set their marriage date in June 1993 in Corvallis, Oregon. (The 
date was set to accommodate the children's attendance at Marc's 
brother's wedding in Utah). (T-71-72). The children were ages 8, 
7 and 5 years old, with the youngest child not yet having entered 
kindergarten. 
Marc was continuing in his practice as a physical 
therapist but had substantially expanded his clinic operations. 
(T-9) . He had always worked hard in his occupation during the 
parties' marriage, when he kept work hours from approximately dawn 
until the late evenings or nights Monday through Fridays, as well 
as Saturday mornings. (T-90) . At time of trial and with his 
expanded clinic operations, he was now working ten to twelve hour 
weekdays, typically from 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. 
or later. In addition, he worked each Saturday morning. (T-10, 29 
and 52) . His enlarged clinic operations now required him to travel 
from Park City to Salt Lake City approximately three afternoons 
each week. (T-ll, 31 and 40) . He never takes vacations from work 
(T-42), although he wanted to take more time off to be with the 
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children, and testified he would limit his work hours if he were 
awarded custody of the parties1 children. Many times he relied on 
others to pick up and deliver the children for visitation since the 
divorce (T-30), used surrogate care for the children (T-29), and 
planned to continue to do so if he were awarded custody of the 
children (T-12-13, 30, 39-40, 144). 
Marc acknowledged Alicia was a good mother to the 
children and that she had always done a very good job as a loving, 
nurturing, careful and conscientious caretaker about whom he could 
not think of any deficiencies as a parent. (T-20-23) . The 
testimony of all other witnesses at trial, including those called 
by Marc, were in agreement as to his assessment of Alicia as a 
mother. (T-24-25, 29, 50, 57, 96, 175, 183, 185, 192, 200, 120, 
Exhibit "6"). Marc characterized the parties1 roles with their 
children as very traditional, with Alicia taking care of the 
household and children and he as the breadwinner. (T-29). Since 
the Decree of Divorce, Marc had visited with the children 
approximately two and one-half weekends per month and had also 
eaten lunch with the children one day per week at their school. 
(T-14, 91, Exhibit "6"). 
Marc filed his Petition to Modify because he was 
concerned about the children going to live in Oregon with Alicia. 
He feared he would be unable to maintain a parental relationship 
through daily contact with the children and that they would not be 
brought up in the LDS religion. (T-22, 24-25). He admitted that 
Alicia has generally been cooperative in providing him information 
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on the children and allowing frequent telephone contact. (T-14, 
3 3-34). His relationship with the children is generally encouraged 
and there have been no threats to ever prevent him from maintaining 
a close relationship with the children. (T-14, 32-34, 162-163). 
Marc believed that Alicia would be open to regular contact and 
visitation with the children once they moved to Oregon. (T-38). 
During their marriage in the Spring of 1989, the parties 
relocated from Colorado to Park City, Utah. (T-9, 66-67). The 
parties had relocated with their children seven times within eight 
years during their marriage, the most recent occasion being on 
their move from Colorado to Park City and Summit County, Utah, in 
1989 because Marc wanted to relocate his physical therapy business. 
(T-66-67). 
Alicia had been a self-supporting stained glass artist 
prior to her marriage to Marc in 1983, had been a homemaker during 
the marriage completely focused on parenting. (T-29, 159). In the 
divorce settlement, she had agreed to five-year term alimony 
because she believed she could re-establish her career after the 
divorce within that period of time the parties1 youngest child was 
established in elementary school. (T-70-71). 
At the time of trial on Marc's Petition for Modification 
of Decree of Divorce, Alicia had begun to re-establish her career 
as a fused glass artist, a technical area within the stain glass 
art field. (T-67-68). She attended a fused glass course in 
Oregon, where she met her fiancee, Mr. Pomeroy (T-69), has tried to 
work out of her home (T-67) and had unsuccessfully attempted to 
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workshop, which Alicia would use, allowing her to work at home and 
care for the children. (T-72, 73, 171). 
Mr. Pomeroy is a widower with no children. (T-171, 178-
179). He has a very good relationship with the parties1 minor 
children, is sensitive to their needs and to maintaining their 
relationship with Marc. (T-114, 121, 175, 194-195, Exhibit "6"). 
His income is sufficient such that he and Alicia can provide a 
comfortable lifestyle for the children in Oregon. (T-146, 171, 
177) . 
Alicia has always been extremely involved in the 
children's lives, in tune with their differences, likes, dislikes 
and needs. (T-86, 99-101, 105, 106-109, 110-113). She rarely uses 
surrogate care for the children. (T-98). The children are doing 
well in school (Exhibits "3", "4" and "5"), are happy and well-
adjusted under Alicia's care, and she and the children appear to 
share a close relationship. (T-88, 122, 183, 192, 200). The two 
older children need ongoing medical attention for allergies and 
infections, which Alicia has always assured they receive. (T-lll-
113) . 
Corvallis, Oregon is a university town with good medical 
facilities. (T-114). The home where Alicia and the children will 
live in Corvallis, Oregon, has a bedroom for each child, is in a 
country setting close. It is close to schools that would offer the 
children education more specific in meeting their needs than the 
education they have received in Park City, Utah. (T-74, 101-102, 
106-107)• 
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had very positive relationships with the children and both were 
good parents, with no real parenting deficits. (T-120) . Although 
the children were ambivalent about their move to Oregon and were 
experiencing some anxiety, the anxiety was primarily related to the 
conflict between the parties over the custody issue and the 
children were accepting their move to Oregon. They had expressed 
no specific desire to live with either parent. (T-122-124). The 
children were to have the advantage of a two-parent home in Oregon, 
and Mr. Peterson believed it was preferable to maintain Alicia as 
the children's primary caretaker. (T-128). 
Mr. Peterson's opinion was that it would be extremely 
disruptive if Alicia were to live in a separate state from the 
children and that it would be more disruptive to the children to be 
separated from their primary caretaker mother given Mr. Larson's 
busy work schedule and need to utilize surrogate care. (T-143-
144). Mr. Peterson noted that Marc's desire for custody was 
perceived to be of short duration. His primary interest was in 
having frequent contact with the children rather than actually 
wanting custody. His legal action was viewed more as an attempt to 
prevent Alicia from moving from the area, rather than gaining 
custody for himself. (Exhibit "6" at page 17). In Mr. Peterson's 
professional opinion, Marc could continue in a strong joint 
custodial relationship with the children living in Oregon through 
an appropriate visitation schedule to include blocks of time during 
summers and holiday periods with the children. (T-128-129). He 
believed Alicia would cooperate with such a schedule (T-131), and 
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pertaining to the issues for review specifically included the 
following: 
4. Plaintiff has been the primary 
caretaker for the parties1 minor children, but 
defendant has had a significant, active, open 
involvement in their lives. Defendant has 
fulfilled a traditional role in the children's 
lives; that is he is the breadwinner and 
plaintiff has been the person designated to 
raise the children, 
5. Notwithstanding the plaintiff has 
been the primary caretaker, the children are 
nearly equally bonded to both parents. 
Defendant is extremely committed to his 
children and wishes to be involved in their 
lives. 
6. Plaintiff and defendant are each 
excellent parents. Each is equally capable of 
caring for the children. 
7. At best, it is speculative whether a 
move to Corvallis, Oregon would be successful 
or permanent. In the summer of 1992, 
plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in 
Corvallis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated 
that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry. 
However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff have not 
yet married, and there is potential for 
conflict if the family were to move in with 
Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to 
Corvallis, Oregon would enhance the children's 
educational environment nor plaintiff's career 
potential. It is a high risk move for 
plaintiff and the children. 
8. Defendant has exercised all 
visitation that has been allowed by plaintiff 
and has sought additional visitation. He has 
been involved in the children's school and has 
been an attentive, caring parent. 
9. The children do not wish to move to 
Corvalis, Oregon. 
10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim 
Peterson, recommended that the children remain 
in the physical custody of plaintiff, he 
indicated in his report that it would be in 
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the children's best interests to remain in 
Utah and reading his report as a whole, it is 
clear that the recommendation was a close 
call. The present custodial arrangements have 
fostered happy well-adjusted lives for the 
children. 
11. A] though ther e ai e i 10 defects in 
plaintiff's capacity or willingness to 
function as a parent, there is some question 
about plaintiff's stability because of her 
several changes cf residence during the year 
since the < ""**":. " decree of divorce 
herein. 
12. Both parents have an equal depth of 
an long term desire for custody. The father 
has shown a commitment to the children. 
1** Defendant would provide personal 
care £ the children by reducing the hours 
that he works and would also be required to 
provide some surrogate care. 
] 4 ., During the marriage, ooth pare 
and the children attended the LDS Church and 
were active in the LDS Church. Since t-^e 
separation of the parties, plai/tif 
ceased to be active in the LDS Church. 
Defendant remains active and wishes to keep 
the children active in the LDS Church- The 
court finds that it is unlikely that# if the 
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, 
plaintiff would continue their religious 
training. 
15. The maj oritj i)f the childrenf s 
extended family, including aunts, uncles, and 
cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah. 
Defendant's children from his prior marriage, 
half-sister and half-brother to these 
children, also live in Utah. these children 
have an excellent relationship with their 
older half-sister and half-brother. They have 
many friends and connections in Utah. 
] 6 ? i move to Corvalis, Oregon is not in, 
the children's best interests; it is in the 
best interests of the children to remain in 
Summit County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to 
continue to reside in Summit County, the 
children will remai n primarily in her physical 
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custody. If, however, plaintiff determines to 
move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical 
custody of the children should be transferred 
to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal 
visitation, 
17. Plaintiff did not keep defendant 
informed of the development of her plans to 
move, or has not kept defendant fully advised 
of the children's activities in school. Each 
party should be admonished to keep the other 
fully informed about the children's activities 
and welfare. 
18. Plaintiff has not shown a need for 
assistance with payment of her attorney's 
fees. 
(R-213-215). The court concluded that the Petition for 
Modification should be granted, that the parties should maintain 
joint legal custody of their children but if plaintiff, Alicia 
Larson, decides to move from Summit County, Utah, then physical 
custody of the children should be transferred to defendant subject 
to reasonable and liberal visitation and that each party should 
bear his or her own attorneys' fees and costs. (R-216) . An Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce was entered consistent therewith. 
(R-283-284). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the 
Decree of Divorce to automatically transfer physical custody of the 
parties' three minor children from Alicia if she does not reside in 
Summit County, Utah, thereby preventing her from relocating where 
better opportunities exist for herself and the children. The 
Findings of Fact of the trial court are not supported by the 
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evidence and are so contrary to the weight of the evidence that 
they are clearly erroneous and must be overturned• When viewed in 
light of the overall evidence and contrary evidence, the facts 
cannot be supported and the court's ruling modifying the Decree of 
Divorce must be reversed. 
The substantial weight of the evidence supports a 
continuing child custody award with Alicia as the children's 
primary physical caretaker whether in Utah or in Oregon. A review 
of the marshalled evidence on those factors which the court should 
consider in determining the custody placement of the parties' minor 
children strongly favors the parties' past custodial relationship. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling modifying the Decree of 
Divorce should be reversed. 
Point II 
The court committed error in considering Alicia's 
personal religious beliefs as a factor in determining the best 
custody placement of the parties' minor children. The Constitution 
of Utah precludes any law establishing religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise of it by considering Alicia's religiousness. The 
State, through the trial court, improperly intonates that parents 
who choose not to observe a certain religious faith are subject to 
having their custodial rights jeopardized because of that choice. 
This impinges on Alicia's right to practice her religion as she 
deems appropriate, thereby violating Utah's free exercise clause. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling modifying the 
Decree of Divorce based upon its perception of Alicia's 
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religiousness should be reversed and the parties1 prior custodial 
arrangement under the terms of the Decree of Divorce reinstated. 
Point III 
The trial court erred in ordering that custody of the 
children automatically transferred to Marc in the event of Alicia's 
relocation from Summit County and in failing to allow her to 
relocate with the children to Oregon. The court inappropriately 
weighed the desires and best interests of Marc in exercising 
weekend visits with the children rather than the best interests of 
the children in remaining in the custody of the children's involved 
caretaker mother. This is particularly inappropriate where 
Alicia's relocation promises opportunities for herself and the 
children and the evidence shows Marc will be able to maintain his 
parental relationship with the children in the event of the move. 
The trial court's ruling jeopardizes the long-term security and 
best interests of the children by failing to allow Alicia to seek 
economic self-sufficiency as was anticipated by the parties at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce in order to assist in providing for 
the parties' minor children. Where her relocation is well-
conceived and has no ill motive, then it should be allowed. 
Point IV 
The testimony was clear that Marc had sufficient income 
to assist Alicia in payment of her attorney's and costs incurred at 
the trial. She had no income except his support and alimony 
payments. The total amount requested was reasonable, there was no 
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objection thereto, and the amount should, therefore, be awarded to 
Alicia. 
Point V 
This Court has the authority to award Alicia the 
attorney's fees and costs that she has incurred in prosecuting and 
maintaining this appeal. Based upon the significant errors in law 
committed at the trial level, an award of attorney's fees on appeal 
is appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO 
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE 
PARTIES' THREE MINOR CHILDREN FROM ALICIA IF 
SHE DOES NOT RESIDE IN SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, 
THEREBY PREVENTING HER FROM RELOCATING WHERE 
BETTER OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR HERSELF AND THE 
CHILDREN. 
A. The Findings of Fact bv the trial court are not 
supported bv the evidence and are so contrary to the weight of the 
evidence that they are clearly erroneous and must be overturned. 
It is well-established that a party challenging a finding 
by a trial court must marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Crouse 
v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court's 
decision regarding custody will not be upset absent of showing of 
an abuse of discretion or manifested injustice. Barnes v. Barnes, 
857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 
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159 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court's findings upon which it 
based its ruling were inadequate when considered in light of the 
overall evidence and contrary evidence as follows: 
1. The court found that: "Notwithstanding the plaintiff 
has been the primary caregiver, the children are nearly equally 
bonded to both parents. Defendant is extremely committed to his 
children and wishes to be involved in their lives." (R-214). The 
evidence in support of this finding was that although the children 
were nearly equally bonded to both parents, they were most probably 
more closely bonded to Alicia than to the defendant, Marc, in the 
opinion of the child custody evaluator. (Exhibit "6", T-125-126). 
Although the court found that the defendant was extremely committed 
to his children and wished to continue to be involved in their 
lives, the evidence showed no strong commitment to assume primary 
care of the children. Defendant's Verified Petition for 
Modification of the Decree of Divorce sought to keep the children 
in Utah under the present custodial arrangement where he was a 
visiting parent, but if no agreement between the parties could be 
reached, then he desired to be awarded physical custody of the 
children. (R-79). In the opinion of the custody evaluator, Marc's 
interest in physical custody of the children was fleeting, his real 
interest being to maintain bi-weekly contact with the children by 
attempting to prevent Alicia from moving from the area. (Exhibit 
"6"). Marc's testimony at trial indicated that his commitment and 
desire to be involved in the children's lives was focused more on 
his fear that he would be unable to maintain his past weekend 
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visitation with children if they were to move with Alicia rather 
than a desire and ability to assume physical custody. (T-24). He 
realized he was unable to care for the children as a primary 
custodian, except during the school year when the children would be 
in school during weekdays. (T-42-43). 
2. The court also found that: 
"7. It is extremely speculative whether a 
move to Corvallis, Oregon, would be successful 
or permanent. In the summer of 1992, 
plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in 
Corvallis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated 
that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry. 
However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff have not 
yet married, and there is a potential for 
conflict if the family were to move in with 
Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about he move to 
Corvallis, Oregon, would enhance the 
children's educational environment nor 
plaintiff's career potential. It is a high 
risk move for and the children." 
There is very little, if any, evidence in support of 
this finding. There is no evidence whatsoever that the move to 
Corvallis, Oregon, would not be successful and permanent. The 
evidence showed that Alicia planned to marry and live in Corvallis, 
Oregon, with her fiancee who had lived in the same house for 
approximately ten years. (T-72, 169). There was no evidence 
whatsoever to suggest that there is potential for conflict if the 
family were to move in with Mr. Pomeroy. The evidence was contrary 
to this finding. Mr. Pomeroy was a stable person, having a good 
relationship with Alicia and the children and was sensitive to the 
children's needs and relationship with Marc. (T-169, 171, 174, 
175) . He earned a good income sufficient to support the new 
household in his home. (T-177, 146). The child custody evaluator 
opined that Mr. Pomeroy was a positive factor in the lives of the 
children (T-121, 122) , and a two-parent home was definitely in the 
children's best interests. (T-128, 138). Furthermore, the 
evidence was contrary to the court's finding that the move to 
Corvallis, Oregon, would not enhance the children's educational 
environment or plaintiff's career potential and that it was a high 
risk move for the plaintiff and the children. The evidence clearly 
demonstrated that there were significant advantages to the 
children's educational environment in Corvallis, Oregon, because 
the school system there addresses the children's specific needs in 
a way that was not done in Summit County, Utah. (T-106-107) . 
There was no evidence that plaintiff had any career potential in 
Utah to establish an earning capacity prior to the termination of 
her alimony award. All evidence demonstrated that her career 
potential would be enhanced by a relocation to Corvallis, Oregon, 
which was the center of her glass fusing trade and where she could 
teach and work from her home. (T-72-74, 198-199, 204). 
3. The court further found that: 
"9. The children did not wish to move to 
Corvallis, Oregon." (R-215). 
There is no evidence that supports this finding. 
Most of the evidence was that the children were ambivalent (i.e. 
conflicted) about moving to Corvallis, Oregon, but they had 
accepted the move with some anxiety due primarily to the custody 
issue in general rather than their anticipated relocation. (T-
122). The children did not express a desire to live with one 
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parent or the other, nor were they asked to make that decision. 
(T-124). 
4. The court also found that: 
"10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim 
Peterson, recommended that the children remain 
in the physical custody of plaintiff, he 
indicated in his report that it would be in 
their best interests to remain in Utah. In 
reading his report as a whole, it is clear 
that the recommendation was a close call. The 
present custodial arrangements have fostered 
happy, well-adjusted lives for the children." 
(R-215). 
While there was evidence that the ideal situation 
would be for Alicia and her fiancee to reside in Summit County, Mr. 
Petersen recognized that it may not be possible. (Exhibit "6" at 
page 17). His opinion was that it would be extremely disruptive 
and contrary to the children's best interests if Alicia were to 
live in a separate state from the children (T-143) , and that it 
would be more disruptive to the children for them to be separated 
from Alicia, who had always been their primary caretaker than for 
them to live in a separate state from their father. (T-143-144). 
5. The court also found that: 
"11. Although there are no defects in 
plaintiff's capacity or willingness to 
function as a parent, there is some question 
about plaintiff's stability because of her 
several changes of residence during the years 
since the entry of the Decree of Divorce." 
(R-215). 
Although there was clearly evidence that Alicia had 
changed her home twice in Park City since the Decree of Divorce, 
there is no evidence whatsoever that these moves should raise any 
question about her stability. She moved from the marital home 
because she could not afford to maintain and Marc suggested that 
she do so. Each move was deliberated and considered by Alicia with 
respect to the children's needs and each move was made to meet 
those needs. (T-38, 75-81). 
6. The court found that: 
"12. Both parents have an equal depth and 
long-term desire for custody. The father has 
shown a commitment to the children." (R-215). 
The evidence did not demonstrate that both parents have 
an equal depth and long-term desire for custody. To the contrary, 
the evidence indicated that Marc recognized he was not in a 
position to accept long-term custody because of his work schedule. 
(T-12, 29, 39, 42-43). His concern was in continuing his joint 
legal relationship with the children through visitation on a 
regular and frequent basis. (T-24). Conversely, the evidence 
showed Alicia had a long-term desire for custody and depth of 
desire by involvement in every aspect of the children's lives in 
detail and on a daily basis. (T-86, 88, 98, 99-102, 105-106, 109-
111, 182, 192, 200). When asked by the trial judge whether she 
would sacrifice her personal happiness to stay with the children in 
Utah, her response was affirmative. (T-168). 
7. The court found that: 
"14. ...it is unlikely that if the children 
were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, plaintiff 
would continue their religious training." (R-
215). 
There is absolutely no evidence that it would be unlikely 
the children would continue in their religious training on a move 
to Corvallis, Oregon. All evidence demonstrated otherwise. Though 
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Alicia did not attend Marc's LDS ward, she delivered and picked the 
children up from his church each Sunday so they could attend those 
services with Marc, even on the weekends when he did not visit with 
the children. (T-149-150). She attends each religious event 
associated with the children's religious upbringing. (T-35). She 
felt it very important for the children to continue in their 
religious training and agreed with those ideals. (T-35, 148-151). 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Alicia had 
investigated the churches in the area where the children would be 
living in Oregon and planned to support them in their religious 
endeavors there. (T-148-149). 
Clearly, the foregoing demonstrates subjectively that the 
court's specific findings supporting its Order Modifying the Decree 
of Divorce were contrary and not supported by the great weight of 
the evidence. Accordingly, these findings should be set aside. It 
is a well established principle of appellate law that an appellate 
court in an equitable action, such as child custody, can review, de 
novo, all the evidence presented at trial and make its own findings 
and conclusions if it chooses to do so and if equity and justice 
require it. [See Wright v. Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978) and 
Wall v. Wall. 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985)]. This court should enter 
its own findings to prevent a substantial injustice to Alicia and 
a result contrary to the children's best interests with regard to 
their continuing care and well being. 
B. The substantial weight of the evidence supports a 
continuation of the parties' child custody arrangement and orders 
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of the Decree of Divorce with regard to whether or not Alicia and 
the children relocate outside Summit County, Utah. 
The child custody orders of the parties' Decree of 
Divorce awarded them joint legal custody of their three minor 
children. Alicia was awarded the primary physical care and custody 
of the children and her residence was designated as the children's 
primary residence, subject to Marc's visitation rights on a 
standard schedule. (R-66-67). This Order essentially confirmed 
the parties' historical relationship and roles with the children 
during the length of the parties' marriage and following the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce. Alicia has always been the primary 
caretaker of the children. They have always lived with her and, 
except for the children's schooling, she has always provided their 
personal care and does not use surrogate care. 
The sole well-established standard the court must apply 
in determining whether any change in circumstances supports a 
change in the child custody orders is the best interests of the 
children. Joraensen v. Jorcrensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). The 
court's primary focus must always been on the best interests of the 
children rather than on the parties, their conduct and desires. 
See e.g. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989) . The 
Utah Supreme Court has set forth certain relevant factors which 
must be considered by the trial court in child placement cases. As 
articulated in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982): 
"Some factors the court may consider in 
determining the best interests relate 
necessary to the children's feelings or 
special needs. The preference of the child; 
26 
keeping siblings together; the relative 
strength of the child's bond to one or both of 
the prospective custodians; and, in 
appropriate cases, the general interest in 
continuing previously arranged custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and 
well-adjusted. Other factors relate primarily 
to the prospective custodian's character or 
status or to their capacity or willingness to 
function as a parent; moral character and 
emotional stability; duration and depth of 
desire for custody; ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care; 
significant impairment of ability to function 
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other cause; reasons for having 
relinquished custody in the past; religious 
compatibility with the child; kinship, 
including any extraordinary circumstances; 
step-parent status; and financial 
considerations." Id. at 41. 
Some of these factors have since been codified in §30-3-
10, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), requiring the court to 
consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standard of each of the parties. They have also 
been summarized in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), where 
the court held that: 
"...the choice of competing child custody 
claims should... be based on function-related 
factors. Common among these, though not 
exclusive, is the identity of the primary 
caretaker during the marriage. Other factors 
should include the identity of the parent with 
greater flexibility to provide personal care 
for the child and the identity of the parent 
with whom the child has spent most of his or 
her time pending a custody determination, if 
that period has been lengthy. Another 
important factor is the stability of 
environment provided by each parent." Id. at 
118. 
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The evidence at trial in this matter on these factors to 
be considered by the trial court in child custody cases was as 
follows: 
1. Identity of the primary caretaker. There was no 
dispute whatsoever that Alicia had always been the primary 
caretaker of the children during the marriage and until the time of 
trial. Marc acknowledged as much, and the trial court so found. 
(T-29, R-214). The evidence was quite clear that Marc had 
historically been self-employed and working long hours from early 
mornings to many times late nights during each weekday, and in 
addition for at least half of each Saturday. (T-10, 29, 52, 90). 
This continued to be his work schedule at time of trial, even 
though he stated his intent to reduce his hours if the children 
were to live with him. (Id., T-ll). 
2. Ability to provide personal care. The evidence was 
clear that Alicia had been a homemaker, primary caretaker to the 
children and did not rely on surrogate care. (T-28, 98). There 
was no evidence that Marc would be in a position to provide 
personal care for the children rather than relying on surrogate 
care, and all evidence indicated that he would have to do so. 
(T-10,12, 29, 30, 39, 40, 42). The trial court also so found. 
(R-215). 
3. Time with primary caretaker. The evidence was clear 
and undisputed that the children had lived with Alicia since their 
birth, spending weekend visitation time with Marc. (T-29, 91). 
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4. Stability of environment. The evidence demonstrated 
that the parties and their children had historically moved 
approximately each year during their marriage but have been 
residing in Park City, Utah, for four years prior to the date of 
trial. (T-16, 66). Each party had changed residences. The 
evidence clearly showed that Alicia deliberated and considered the 
children's interests and needs whenever she had to change their 
home and that the children's environment continued to be stable and 
meet their specific needs. (T-75-81). 
5. Children's feelings or special needs. The children 
were probably more closely bonded to Alicia than to Marc, although 
both parents were good parents. (T-125, Exhibit "6" at page 16). 
The children were ambivalent about moving to Corvallis, Oregon, but 
had accepted that move. (T-122). It would be extremely disruptive 
to the children if they were to live in a separate state from their 
mother. (T-143-144) . The children have special medical needs, 
which Alicia has always met. (T-lll-113). 
6. Preference of the child. The children expressed no 
preference between the parents. (T-122-124). 
7. Strength of the child's bond to the parents. The 
children were probably more closely bonded to Alicia than to Marc, 
although both parents were good parents. (T-125). It would be 
extremely disruptive to the children if they were to live in a 
separate state from their mother. (T-143-144). The children have 
special medical needs, which Alicia has always met. (T-lll-113). 
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8. Adjustment of the child. The children were happy 
and well-adjusted with Alicia, who had always done a good job of 
raising them in the assessment of both Marc and the child custody 
evaluator. (T-22-25, Exhibit "6"). There was no evidence that the 
children had become unhappy nor were they maladjusted in Alicia's 
care. 
9. Custodianfs character or status or capacity or 
willingness to function as a parent. Both parties were good 
parents. Marc acknowledged Alicia as being a very concerned, 
conscientious, attentive, loving and nurturing caretaker. (T-23-
25). The court found no defects in plaintiff's capacity or 
willingness to function as a parent. (R-215). 
10. Moral character and emotional stability. There was 
no question that the parties were of good moral character and 
emotionally stable. There was no evidence of any emotional 
instability on the part of either party. 
11. Duration and depth of desire for custody. The 
defendant testified that he wanted to maintain his close 
relationship with the children and was prepared to assume their 
physical custody. (T-ll, 24). However, his primary concern was in 
maintaining regular contact with the children to continue in his 
parenting role. (T-24). The child custody evaluator did not 
perceive Marc's desire for physical custody to be long-term. 
(Exhibit "6" at page 16). Marc's interest in the children was 
perceived as not one desirous of physical custody but rather of 
keeping the children available for him to visit. (Exhibit "6" at 
30 
page 16). Alicia's detailed involvement in every aspect of the 
childrenfs well-being over the course of their lives clearly 
demonstrates the duration and depth of her desire for continued 
custody. If faced with the choice of sacrificing her personal 
happiness in marriage to being available to care for the children, 
she would chose to be with the children. (T-168). 
12. Impairment of ability to function as a parent. 
Neither parent had any impairment of their ability to function as 
a parent. 
13. Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past. 
Marc agreed for Alicia to continue in her parenting role with the 
children as their primary caretaker, and that is the basis upon 
which the child custody orders reflected in the Decree of Divorce 
were made. (R-55-65). Alicia has never relinquished custody of 
the children. 
14. Religious compatibility with the children. Marc is 
concerned that the children will be brought up in the religion he 
practices, the LDS faith, and fears that Alicia will not support 
the children in that training. (T-20-23). However, the evidence 
clearly shows Alicia to be completely compatible with the children 
and their religious interests, though she may not attend Marc's LDS 
church. (T-35, 148-150). She takes the children to church each 
Sunday and picks them up after the service. (T-149). She attends 
their religious events. (T-35). She shares their religious 
interests and values. (T-149-150, 35). There was no evidence 
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whatsoever that Alicia was incompatible with the children's 
religious interests. 
15. Kinship and step-parent status. Both parties are 
natural parents to the minor children, and there is no issue of 
kinship between the parties and the children. The evidence clearly 
showed that Alicia's fiancee had a good relationship with the 
children and was a positive factor in the children's future, 
encouraging their relationship with Marc. (T-175-176). 
16. Financial considerations. There was no evidence 
that the parties could not financially care for the children, and 
the evidence was clear that the children would be adequately 
provided for in Corvallis, Oregon. (T-146). 
On all of the evidence presented upon the relevant 
factors to be considered in determining the best interests 
placement of the parties' minor children, the great weight of 
evidence is to maintain the current custodial arrangement, with 
Alicia having primary care and custody of the children. There was 
no evidence that Marc could not maintain his relationship with the 
children if Alicia and the children were to relocate to Corvallis, 
Oregon. In the opinion of the child custody evaluator, Marc's 
relationship with the children could be maintained on an 
appropriate visitation schedule as he recommended, and Alicia would 
support Marc's relationship with the children. (T-128-130; Exhibit 
"6" at page 17) . On a de novo review of all the evidence presented 
at trial, this court should reverse the trial court ruling 
automatically transferring physical custody of the parties' minor 
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children to Marc if Alicia chooses to relocate with the children to 
Corvallis, Oregon, and permit her to do so. Upon a review of all 
of the evidence by this court and the issue of child custody 
placement, the findings are so lacking in support of the trial 
court's ruling and the clear weight of the evidence supports Alicia 
continuing as the children's primary custodian. The ruling of the 
trial court which may disallow this arrangement to continue is 
clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
Point II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING ALICIA'S 
PERSONAL RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS A FACTOR IN 
DETERMINING THE CHILD CUSTODY PLACEMENT OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN. 
One of the factors that the court may consider in child 
custody placement cases under the Hutchinson, supra, holding, is 
the religious compatibility between the parent and the children. 
In this case, there was no evidence whatsoever that Alicia and the 
children had any religious incompatibility. The court improperly 
considered Alicia's personal religiousness and the manner she 
chooses to practice her religion as a factor to denying her the 
right to continue as the children's primary custodian and caretaker 
in Corvallis, Oregon. Specifically, the trial court stated that: 
"The mother, while she testifies that she is 
in favor of the children having religious 
training consistent with their life, and that 
is a part of their life, the move to Corvallis 
is not compatible with the religious training 
that has been provided to the children. The 
mother does not intend to attend religious 
services. It is not very practical to take 
five, seven and eight year old children and 
drop them off, and she said she would go with 
them when they go there. I think that smacks 
of the incredulous. She does not have a 
commitment to the religion. And to think that 
she is going to go there to foster it causes 
me to doubt her credibility. I just don't 
think she would do it, and I don't think I 
would expect her to do it. So, it is far more 
compatible for the children to remain in their 
religious environment in which they are 
present in." (T-237-238). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho decided the case of Osteraas 
v. Osteraas. 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993), which is strikingly similar 
to the Larson case. In Osteraas, the parties were divorce in 1986 
and awarded the joint legal custody of their two twin sons, with 
the mother awarded physical custody and the father awarded rights 
of visitation. In 1990, the father moved for a change of physical 
custody in response to the mother's intent to remarry and move to 
another state. The trial court, known as the Magistrate Court, 
granted the father's Petition to Modify custody and awarded him 
custody of the children for nine months of the years, with the 
mother having custody during the summer. The trial court found 
that the parents were equal in almost all respects. However, the 
scales tipped in favor of the father having custody based upon the 
"religion" factor. The district court reversed the trial court's 
decision, finding that the lower court had improperly considered 
the religious issue in determining custody. The father appealed 
the ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court. The trial court had found 
that the mother was not active in any religion and had not been for 
some period of time and that the father, although not active in his 
religion, was more likely to teach the children good character 
traits based upon his religious background. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court held that: 
"Breaching the rule of religious non-
interference as to custody proceedings 
implicates both the free exercise and anti-
establishment clauses. U.S. Constitution 
Amendment I. When the state, speaking through 
its court, intimates that parents who choose 
not to observe a certain (or indeed, any) 
religious faith are subject to having their 
custodial rights jeopardized because of that 
choice, then the import will be to force upon 
each of those parents a painful and 
unconscionable decision to either hold to 
their own beliefs or maintain custody of their 
children. Such a decision would thus impinge 
upon their right to choose and adhere to their 
own respective beliefs, thereby violating the 
free exercise clause." Id. at 952. 
The Idaho court further held that: 
"The other affect of utilizing the religion 
factor in deciding custody disputes is that 
the courts will be seen as appearing to favor 
one religion over another, or favor religion 
in general as against no declared religion, 
thus using the factor would serve to establish 
such religion in contravention to the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause because it 
would have the primary effect of advancing 
religion... It is thus clear that the trial 
court's distinction between religion and lack 
thereof cannot prevail against provisions 
stated in the United States Constitution." 
Citations omitted. 
Like the Idaho Constitution, the Constitution of Utah 
Section 4 states that: "The State shall make no law respecting 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
...nor shall church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions." 
It is clear that the court took into consideration the 
fact that Alicia does not intend to attend religious services. In 
so doing, the court not only interfered with Alicia's religious 
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freedom but also appears to have favored religion in general over 
Alicia's decision not to be involved in organized religion and this 
time. In making its decision, therefore, the court made specific 
findings that plaintiff has ceased to be active in the LDS Church 
and that, furthermore, the court did not believe she would continue 
the children's religious training in the LDS Church. Clearly this 
favors religion as well as interfering with Alicia's free exercise 
thereof in direct violation not only of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, but also Section 1 and Section 4 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN WEIGHING THE DESIRES 
AND BEST INTERESTS OF MARC RATHER THAN THOSE 
OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN IN 
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRING PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
FROM THE CHILDREN'S PRIMARY CARETAKER IN THE 
EVENT OF HER RELOCATION FROM SUMMIT COUNTY, 
UTAH. AND IN FAILING TO ALLOW HER TO RELOCATE 
WITH THE CHILDREN TO CORVALLIS. OREGON. 
The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their 
three minor children under the terms of the Decree of Divorce, with 
Alicia being awarded their primary care and custody and residence 
designated as that of the children. This child custody order does 
not give Marc the right to determine where Alicia should live with 
the children or where their residence should be; their residence is 
simply to be with her. Where a parental right is not specifically 
addressed in the terms of a joint legal custody order, then that 
parental right may be exercised by the parent having physical 
custody of the child the majority of the time. Section 3 0-3-
10.3(4), Utah Code Ann. (1993). Pursuant to this statute, Alicia 
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has the right to determine where she and the children shall live. 
She should be entitled to exercise this right unless it is clearly 
contrary to the children's best interests. 
The only changed circumstance in this case which would 
support a modification of the child custody and visitation awards 
is the plaintiff's anticipated relocation to the State of Oregon 
with the parties' three minor children to marry her fiancee and 
live with him in his home in Oregon. The sole well-established 
standard the court must apply in determining whether this 
anticipated change of circumstances supports a change in the child 
custody orders is the best interests of the children. Jorcrensen, 
supra. The personal desire and conduct of the parents is 
irrelevant unless it has an impact on the children's best 
interests. 
Marc's expressed desire and concerns in seeking to 
prevent Alicia and the children from moving to Corvallis, Oregon, 
are focused on his perception that the geographical distance 
between him and the children will prevent him from continuing in 
his parental role, traditionally the breadwinner and now visiting 
parent to the children approximately two and one-half weekends each 
month. (T-24, 29, 91, 41). The child custody evaluator testified 
that the good relationship Marc currently has with the parties' 
minor children could be maintained through the visiting schedule he 
recommended. (T-128-129, Exhibit "6" at 17). Despite this 
evidence, the trial court determined that the children should be 
cared for and reside in Summit County, Utah, where their father 
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lives, and if Alicia desires to relocate, then the children will be 
cared for by their father in order to preserve and promote that 
relationship. 
The question of whether it is in the best interests of 
the children to transfer custody to the non-custodial parent where 
the custodial parent plans to move with the children to another 
state has been examined by many courts within the Pacific Reporter 
region. In most all instances, the courts allow the children to be 
relocated where there is a legitimate reason in the children's best 
interests for the custodial parent's relocation to another state. 
See e.g. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 242 Mont. 62 788 P.2d 328 (1990), 
determining that a custodial parent is presumptively entitled to 
change her own and the child's residence where the mother was the 
primary custodian and did not intend to work outside the home while 
the father was fully employed; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 
(N.M. 1991), the primary physical custodial was entitled to 
relocate with the parties' minor children to a distant area where 
her family lived and she could find employment; Ditto v. Ditto, 628 
P. 2d 777 (Or. App. 1981) where the custodial was allowed to 
relocate to New Zealand with the children, the court noting the 
happiness and well-being of the custodial parent is an ingredient 
of the welfare of the children; and most recently in Love v. Love, 
851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993), the primary physical custodian of the 
minor children was granted leave to relocation with the parties' 
minor child where the parties' had exercised a divided custody 
arrangement. 
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In the Love case, the Wyoming court examined and 
summarized the "wide array of standards, tests and presumptions 
that have been applied in relocation cases in other jurisdictions" 
(Id. at 1287) and held that relocation will be allowed so long as 
the custodial parent has good motives for the move and that mere 
inconvenience to the non-custodial parent must be shown to defeat 
the custodial parent's right to relocate. There the children were 
happy and well-adjusted under the care of their mother, who desired 
to relocate from Wyoming to South Dakota to further her career 
where opportunities were not available to do so in Wyoming. The 
mother, as is Alicia, was supporting herself under a durational 
alimony award due to terminate. The father including exercising 
weekend and summer visitation rights and participating in the 
children's extracurricular activities. 
In allowing the custodial parent to relocate with the 
children, the court noted that: 
"...Our review looks more closely at balancing 
the continued rights of the parties with the 
best interests of the children as established 
at the time of the divorce. We will consider 
the attributes and characteristics of the 
parents and children and how the children have 
fared under the original custody and 
visitation arrangement. We will consider also 
whether the relocating parent's motives for 
proposing the move are legitimate, sincere, in 
good faith and whether reasonable visitation 
is possible for the remaining parent." Id. at 
1288. 
The analysis applied by the Wyoming court in Love is 
similar to the examination of the parties' roles with regard to the 
upbringing of their children that the courts in Utah apply, as 
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reflected in the Hutchinson and Pusev decisions, supra; where the 
children are happy and well-adjusted under the care of their 
primary caretaker parent, then that person should continue to be 
allowed to so act. It is particularly important and in the best 
interests of the children that Alicia Larson be allowed to continue 
in her parenting role with the children as their primary caretaker 
and to relocate with them to Corvallis, Oregon, where there clearly 
are great opportunities for enhancing her life and the children's 
lives. Although this relocation would result in inconvenience to 
Mr. Larson, there is no evidence that indicates he would be unable 
to continue in his parental role with the children and that Alicia 
would not encourage that relationship. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ALICIA HER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED 
IN DEFENDING DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) grants trial courts the 
power to award attorneys' fees in a divorce action. See Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). In making an 
attorneys' fee award, the decision must be based upon "evidence of 
the receiving spouse's financial need for attorneys' fees, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
award." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the Larson case, the court concluded that Alicia had 
now shown the need for assistance with payments of her attorney's 
fees and, therefore, ordered that both parties should pay their own 
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fees and costs. This finding is contrary to the evidence and 
constitutes error by the trial court. 
The evidence established that Marc Larson had adjusted 
gross income in 1991 of approximately $150,000 from his clinic 
business. (T-144, Exhibit "2"). In addition, Marc anticipated 
that his 1992 income would be fairly close to what it was in 1991. 
(T-44) . Alicia, on the other hand, testified that she had no 
taxable income and her only source of income was alimony and child 
support. In spite of this evidence, the court found that Alicia 
had not shown a need for assistance with payment of attorney's 
fees. (T-76). 
Alicia's attorney proffered testimony that the total 
expenses, fees and costs incurred in relation to the defense of 
Marc's Petition to Modify was $4,677.40 plus an additional $400 
which was paid directly to the custody evaluator, for a grand total 
of $5,077.40. Mr. Sheaffer further testified as to his hourly rate 
and his opinion that the total fees were reasonable in this case 
based upon his expertise as a practitioner in the area of family 
law. Marc's attorney, Ellen Maycock, made no objection to the 
total amount of the fees, the reasonableness of the fees nor Mr. 
Sheaffer's hourly rate. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Alicia should 
be awarded her attorney's fees in the amount of $5,077.40. 
Point V 
ALICIA IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY HER IN 
THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS APPEAL. 
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Section 30-3-3(1), Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended), is 
the statutory basis for an award of attorneys1 fees in divorce 
actions. It states that: 
fl
...[I]n any action to establish an order of 
custody, visitation, child support, alimony or 
division of property in a domestic case, the 
court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney's fees, and witness fees, including 
expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend 
the action. The order may include provisions 
for costs of the action." 
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's 
fees incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See Dahlberg 
v. Dahlbera. 77 Utah 157, 292, P.214 (1930); Carter v. Carter, 584 
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978); and Mauahan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 162 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Clearly, the statute gives this Court the authority to 
award Alicia her attorney's fees to allow her to "prosecute" the 
appeal to a successful resolution in her favor. 
This Court has also consistently held that a party to a 
divorce action who is successful on an appeal is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with 
maintaining the appeal. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 839 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Points I, II, III, IV and V of this Brief clearly 
demonstrate the trial court committed significant errors in 
granting Marc's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce 
and requiring Alicia to remain in Summit County with the children 
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or, if she should decide to move from Summit County, that physical 
custody of the children would be transferred to Marc. In so 
ordering, the trial court gave Alicia no alternative other than to 
appeal to this Court to correct the substantial inequities. 
This Court should award Alicia all of her attorney's fees 
and costs related to pursuing this appeal and the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the same and 
entry of an appropriate judgment against Marc. 
The trial court erred in failing to award Alicia her 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending Marc's Petition to 
Modify. The testimony was clear that Marc has sufficient income to 
assist Alicia in paying her attorney's fees and, moreover, Alicia 
has no income other than the money she receives as alimony and 
child support. Furthermore, this court should award Alicia her 
fees and costs incurred in prosecuting artd maintaining this appeal. 
DATED this ^ ~ day of \J (f"^-~ , 1994. 
DART, ADAMSON & 
Bv 
''JOHN D. SHEAFFER ^JR./ 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
ALICIA LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MARC S. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 10958 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
-oOo-
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on the 25th day of March, 1992, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding, plaintiff appearing in person and by 
and through her attorney, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., and defendant 
appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Ellen Maycock; 
and counsel for each party having previously met together with the 
Court in chambers at the pre-trial settlement conference on 
March 23, 1992, to advise the Court of the issues remaining to be 
resolved, and thereafter all issues in dispute having been resolved 
by agreement between the parties involved herein, and the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement of the parties having 
now been read into the record in the presence of plaintiff and 
OOOOGo 
BOOK umDiwmn 
defendant., and each party having confirmed the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement and acknowledged their agreement to 
be bound by the terms thereof, and this Stipulation having been 
accepted and approved by the Court, and defendant having consented 
therein that his Answer and Counterclaim be withdrawn and his 
default be entered, and the default of the defendant having been 
entered, and the plaintiff having been sworn and examined on the 
basis of her Complaint, and the Court being otherwise fully advised 
and having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, with 
said Decree to become final upon signature and entry by the Court. 
2. Child Custody, Plaintiff and defendant are awarded 
the joint legal custody of the parties1 three minor children, to 
wit: BRANDI ANNE LARSON, bom Mary 26, 1984; APRIL KRISTEN LARSON, 
born July 20, 1985; and ANGIE MAYE LARSON, born October 14, 1987. 
The plaintiff is awarded the primary physical care, custody and 
control of the children, and the primary residence of the children 
is designated with the plaintiff. The defendant is awarded the 
right to physical custody of the children during reasonable and 
liberal times and places to include at least the following: 
-approximately two and one-half weekends each month; extended summer 
visits; one-half of Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day; alternating 
other legal holidays; during the summer months when the children 
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are not in school the visitation schedule should be adjusted to 
allow for weekday visits. Each party shall cooperate in fostering 
and maintaining one another's relationship and parental role with 
the children and each party shall inform one another of issues of 
importance as they may arise in the children's lives so as to allow 
the parties to jointly participate in making decisions concerning 
the children's upbringing. If the parties are unable to reach 
agreement on any such issue, however, then they shall first attempt 
resolution of the dispute through mediation before bringing the 
issue to the Court for resolution. 
Each party shall give the other party a minimum of 
thirty (3 0) days advance written notice prior to relocating from 
the Park City, Utah, area to allow the parties to participate in 
mediation of any child custody issue prior to relocation. 
3. Child Support. The defendant shall pay child 
support to the plaintiff in the sum of $800 per month per child for 
a total amount of $2,400 per month, to continue as to each child 
until the age of eighteen years and graduation from high school in 
due course. As additional child support, the defendant is ordered 
to pay one-half of any and all work-related day care expenses 
incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor children as a result 
of any out-of-home employment earning plaintiff taxable income. 
4. Dependency Exemptions. Beginning with the 1992 tax 
year, the defendant is awarded the right to claim the parties1 two 
eldest children as dependents for federal and state income tax 
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purposes, and the plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the 
parties1 youngest child as a dependent for this purpose. 
5. Alimony. The defendant shall pay alimony to 
plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 per month beginning April 1, 1992, 
and continuing thereafter each month for a period of five (5) years 
until April 1, 1997, or until the death of either party, whichever 
shall occur first, at which time defendant's alimony obligation 
shall automatically terminate. Defendant's alimony obligation 
shall not be subject to reduction due to any increase to 
plaintiff's income during the five year duration of the award, nor 
shall the award of alimony terminate by reason of plaintiff's 
remarriage within said period of duration. 
6. Health Insurance. The defendant shall maintain his 
present policy of health, accident and hospitalization insurance 
for the benefit of the parties' minor children or a policy having 
equivalent coverage and benefits for the minor children. The 
plaintiff shall be responsible for all uninsured, routine medical 
and dental expenses. Each party shall be responsible for one-half 
of any and all other uninsured and deductible medical, dental 
orthodontic, optical and psychotherapeutic and other such expenses 
incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children. 
7. Life Insurance. Defendant shall maintain in full 
force and effect a policy of life insurance on his life having a 
benefit payable on death in the minimum sum of $300,000 naming the 
parties' minor children as exclusive primary beneficiaries, with 
the plaintiff to be designated as trustee. 
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- Household Furniture, Furnishings and pftrRnnAi 
Effects. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired 
certain items of household furniture and furnishings, personal 
effects and belongings which are hereby awarded between the parties 
as divided, with the plaintiff awarded all such items in her 
possession, and the defendant awarded all such items in his 
possession. 
9. Vehicles. The plaintiff is awarded the Plymouth 
Voyager Van as her separate property subject to the debt owing 
thereon to Zions First National Bank, which she shall assume, pay 
and hold defendant harmless therefrom. The defendant is awarded 
the Kawasaki motorcycle as his separate property. 
10. Real Property. The parties1 interests in real 
property is hereby equitably distributed as follows: 
a. Home. The home and real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, commonly known as 1286 Moray Court in 
Park City, Utah, is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property free and clear of any interest of the defendant, 
subject to the mortgages owing to Capital City Bank and to Barney 
and Evelyn Saunders, which she shall assume, pay and hold defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
b. Condominium. The condominium commonlv known =»-
No. 8, Windrift Condominium, located in Park C 
to the defendant as his sole and separate pro; 
of any interest of the plaintiff, subjec 
cain 
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obligation owing thereon to Draper Bank, which defendant snail 
assume, pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
11. IRA Accounts. The IRA account(s) maintained in the 
Franklin US Government Securities Fund are hereby divided equally 
between the parties. 
12. Summit Sports Medicine. During the marriage, the 
defendant established his physical therapy practice now known as 
Summit Sports Medicine. The defendant is awarded all assets of 
Summit Sports Medicine, including equipment, receivables and the 
vehicle associated with Summit Sports Medicine, as his separate 
property, together with all liabilities associated therewith, 
including the taxes, accounts payable and Vail Medical Center and 
Fitness Center notes payable, which shall be defendant's 
responsibilities and he shall assume, pay and hold plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
13. Crystal Images. The plaintiff is awarded all assets 
of her Crystal Images art operation, including equipment, supplies 
and inventory as her separate property subject to any liabilities 
and obligations incurred through Crystal Images, which plaintiff 
shall assume, pay and hold defendant harmless therefrom. 
14. ITT Life Insurance. During the marriage, the 
parties accumulated a cash surrender value in an ITT life insurance 
policy of at least $3,500, which shall be immediately surrendered 
and distributed to the plaintiff as her sole and separate property. 
15. Checking and Savings Accounts. During the course of 
the parties1 marriage, the parties accumulated funds in certain 
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checking and savings accounts.
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checking and savings accounts maintained in her separate name as 
her sole and separate property, and the defendant is awarded the 
checking and savings accounts maintained in his separate name and 
in the name of his business as his sole and separate property. 
16. Property Settlement, Plaintiff is awarded judgment 
in her favor and against defendant in the principal sum of $86,500 
to earn interest at the rate of 4% per annum from April 1, 1992, 
until April 1, 1997, at which time this judgment shall be due and 
payable to plaintiff and shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum until fully paid and satisfied. This property settlement 
award and judgment shall be appropriately secured by defendant's 
Summit Sports Medicine assets, accounts, accounts receivable, 
equipment and vehicle, and the security interest shall be 
appropriately perfected. This security interest is subordinate to 
any necessary extension of credit to defendant and Summit Sports 
Medicine for business purposes* 
17. Debts. The parties1 debts and obligations shall be 
distributed and paid as follows: 
a. Plaintifffs Debts. The plaintiff shall assume, 
pay and hold defendant harmless from the home mortgages owing to 
Capital City Bank and the Saunders, the automobile loan owing to 
Zions First National Bank for the Plymouth van and any debts and 
obligations associated with Crystal Images. 
b. Defendant's Debts. The defendant shall assume, 
pay and hold plaintiff harmless from the following debts and 
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O b l i g a t i o n s : t h e a m o u n t owing to First I n t e r s t a t e B a n * on tne line 
of credit extended for the purpose of plaintiff's attorneys' fees 
retainer and costs, the automobile loan owing to Zions First 
National Bank for defendant's daughter's automobile, and the 
automobile loan owing to Larry Miller and any and all debts and 
obligations associated with defendant's Summit Sports Medicine 
practice. 
18. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Each party shall assume 
and pay their own attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein. 
19. Mutual Cooperation. Each party shall cooperate with 
the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes in 
titles to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change the 
names of responsible parties for payment upon the charge accounts 
and other debts divided herein, and to cooperate in each and every 
other way necessary or proper to insure that the orders of the 
Court entered are carried out in every detail. 
DATED this 2~ 7 day of ^^/fr-^-w^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED: 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
By. i/~ V / / v ^ -
/ . 
ELLEd*'' MAYCOCK 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the >( ' day 
of April, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/ 
000973 
A ' ^ 
IRENE M. CLARK 
'.O. EG* 18747 
alt Lake City, Utah 84118 
J01) 965-9511 7588-3578 
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CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION 
(Confidential) 
Plaintiff: Alicia Larson 
Defendant: Marc Larson 
Case Number: 10958, Summit county 
Kim Peterson, MSW 
Licensed Clinical Social Wot 
RECEIVED 
JAN 1 3 1993 
baa. Adamson & 
Date: 12-26-92 
UMT/i 
The plaintiff, Alicia Larson, is a 39-year-old Caucasian 
female who lives in Park City, Utah. The defendant, Marc Laxson, 
is a 41-year-old Caucasian male who also lives in Park City. 
Alicia and Marc were married August 27, 1983 and were 
divorced April, 1992. They have three children, Brandi, age 8 
(DOB: 5-20-84), April age 7 (DCS: 7-26-85), and Angie, aye 5 
(DOB: 10-14-86). Alicia and Mark share legal joint custody with 
her home having been designated as the children's primary 
residence. Alicia is currently planning on remarriage and 
relocating in Corvalis, Oregon, and Marc has filed for full 
custody of the children. 
XX 
Plaintiff: Alicia Larson is the youngest of two 
children. She was raised "everywhere," as 
her father was in the military. Her parents had a stagnant 
marriage, but Alicia reported a good relationship with both 
parents and a happy childhood. She was an above-average student 
and has attended one year of college. 
Alicia denied any history of psychiatric disturbance, she 
denied any alcohol abuse, but during her early twenties, she 
occasionally used marijuana and cocaine. She has never been 
arrested. 
Alicia married her first husband, Gene wingate, when age 19 
He was considerably older and a rock musician 
abusive, and she became disenchanted with his 
after about one year. She was single for the 
during her mid-twenties, she lived with a roan 
two years. 
He was physically 
lifestyle and left 
next ten years, but 
for approximately 
Marc was Alicia's physical therapist, and she was attracted 
to him because ho was helpful, caring, and funny, and "I thought 
he was like that all the time." However, after they married, she 
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found him to be entirely different at home. He did not 
communicate and was unaffectionate. Ke normally worked until 
7:00 to 8:00 p.m., and when he came home, he would do charting or 
eat dinner while he watched TV. Marc had his life, and she and 
the girls had their lives, and she found her marriage to be very 
lonely. Alicia said it was almost impossible to engage Marc in 
any meaningful conversation. They saw numerous marital 
therapists, and Alicia did everything she could to improve their 
relationship. However, nothing had any lasting effect, and their 
relationship continued to deteriorate. Alicia said she often 
made plans to leave, but she stayed, as she did not want to admit 
failure. She said it was like "living with a dead person," and 
she finally ran out of things to distract herself, and eventually 
she found the courage to leave. 
Alicia indicated Marc loves the children, and when home from 
work, he would often become quite involved with the children. 
However, she usually had to ask Marc to help with the children, 
and he refused to have his sleep interrupted. Alicia felt Marc 
usually had his head buried in the sand, and he would be unaware 
if the children had symptoms of illness, and his typical response 
was "they'll be fine." If the children misbehaved, he would 
simply "tune it out," and he did not become involved in 
discipline. His relationship with the children has been "fun," 
but he has not been very close to them, and his older daughter 
from a previous marriage has said, "you can't really talk to my 
dad." Since the separation and divorce, Marc has maintained 
regular visitation, he has become more attentive when he has the 
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before, like helping them with school work. 
In contrast, Alicia saw herself as being a "great" parent. 
She felt she has alv/ays provided excellent care, and she has been 
tuned in to the children's emotional and developmental needs. 
She has found parenting to be a very enjoyable experience, and 
she is able to really talk to the children and treats them as 
human beings. The children have been her first priority, she has 
given them a lot of attention, and she spends quality time with 
them. She has spent a lot of time helping the children with 
their intellectual development, and she usually helps them with 
school work. Alicia felt she was very aware of any problems the 
children are having, and she felt she did a good job with 
discipline and guidance. At times, she will yell at the 
children, but for the most part, she remains calm. Alicia felt 
the children had alv/ays been more closely bonded to her. 
Defendant: Marc Larson was raised in Grand Junction, 
Colorado. He is the second of five children. 
He reported a close relationship with his mother, but he was not 
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very close to his father, as he was deaf, and it was difficult to 
communicate with him. As a child, Marc was introverted and a 
home body, but he was a good student and became involved in extra 
curricular activities. Marc is a college graduate. 
Marc denied any specific psychiatric difficulties, but when 
he went on a mission for the LDS Church, he had difficulty 
adjusting to being away from home. During the marriage to 
Alicia, they saw numerous marital therapists. Marc denied any 
problems with substance abuse or difficulty with the lav/. 
Marc married his first wife, Pain, when age 21. They 
divorced after five years due to incompatibility, and she wanted 
out. They have two children, Laurie, age IS, and Matthew, age 
16, who haveslived with their mother since the time of the 
divorce. 
Three years after his divorce, Marc married Alicia after a 
courtship lasting approximately six months. He found her to be 
attractive and intelligent, but they began having problems 
shortly after they got married. There were numerous stressors, 
and Alicia was unhappy with the long hours required by his 
business. They had difficulty communicating, and "the more she 
knew about me, the less she liked." They grew apart emotionally 
and sexually, and they had different interests. There was a lot 
of conflict over the way Alicia treated his older children, and 
there was a lot of stress from having Alicia's younger step-
brother, who had a lot of behavior problems, living with them. 
Later there was also conflict over how they should raise their 
three children. Another area of conflict was religion, as Alicia 
was not as devout as he was. When they disagreed, Alicia would 
become overly assertive and would attack him and become verbally 
abusive, and he would withdraw, which made him feel even more 
lonely, and "it was an ugly and vicious cycle." Alicia had been 
talking about divorce for two to three years prior to the 
separation, and their relationship during that time had been more 
like roommates. 
Overall, Marc saw Alicia as being a good parent. She meets 
the children's basic needs, is loving, and spends quality time 
with the children. However, she has had numerous weaknesses. 
She was a poor housekeeper, and even though she did not work, at 
times, she required the services of a maid and a nanny, and she 
began putting the children in child care when they "were quite 
young. Marc said when he returned home from work, Alicia "would 
have had it* with the children, and she has a history of becoming 
irritable and yelling at the children. Marc complained that 
after the separation, Alicia turned away from LDS values, and she 
began using alcohol and having men spend the night, which has 
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been confusing to the children. She has used the children by 
threatening to take them away from him, and since announcing her 
plans to move to Oregon, she has tried to brainwash the children 
against him. 
Marc saw himself as being a good parent. He said he really 
enjoys playing with the children and doing things with them, but 
"I just wish I had more time." In spite of a demanding work 
schedule, Marc said he has always been involved in child rearing 
when at home. Marc said he has not had outside interests, and 
"when not at work, he has been at home. Marc said he has always 
played with the children and takes them on activities, and he has 
put a lot of effort into teaching the children about values and 
their religion. Marc felt he did a good job with discipline, and 
he sticks tovlimits when they are set. He uses time-out and has 
rarely used corporal punishment. Since the separation, Marc said 
he has tried very hard not to be a Disneyland daddy, and he has 
established rules, chores, and responsibilities in his home. He 
felt he and the children have a close bond. He felt April was 
more closely bonded to him, but Angie and Brandi are somewhat 
more bonded to their mother. 
?1aintiff: After separating, April, 1391, Alicia stayed 
in the family home with the children. 
Because of the larger house payment, she moved to a smaller 
three-bedroom home, which she rents, approximately four months 
ago. Alicia has been receiving $5,400 per month in alimony and 
child support, and in addition, she has been self-employed as a 
stained glass artist and has produced three books. Her self-
employment income is approximately $10,000 per year. 
Alicia said her lifestyle has centered around the children 
and getting her life back on track. Alicia said she was no 
longer active in the LDS Church, but she isn't against it, and 
she takes the children. She indicated that she planned to expose 
the children to different religions and give them a choice. 
Since June, IS32, she has been dating Doug Pomeroy, age 40, and 
they plan on getting married in January, 1393. Doug is also a 
g-iass artist. He lives in Corvalis, Oregon, and Alicia plans on 
moving there right after the first of the year. She denied 
wanting to move to cut Marc out of the children's lives. She 
said, though, that she has been uncomfortable living in Park 
City, as Marc is prominent, and "I am that woman.* In contrast, 
Doug is well-established in Corvalis, and she felt it made more 
sense for her to move to Corvalis. At first, the children were 
apprehensive about moving, but they have come to accept the idea. 
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Doug reported growing up in Lake Chelan, Washington. He is 
the youngest of four children. Doug reported a good relationship 
with his parents and a happy childhood. He was an average 
student and has attended one year of college. Doug was 
previously married for a period of nine years. His wife died of 
Hodgkinfs disease in 1991. They did not have any children. Doug 
has been self-employed as a stained glass artist for the past 
twelve years and earns approximately $15,000 per year. He owns a 
four-bedroom home, and his studio is located next to his home. 
Doug denied any history of psychiatric problems or alcohol abuse. 
He admitted to occasional recreational use of marijuana prior to 
15 years ago. In 1974, he was arrested for possession of 
marijuana and was given a fine of $100.00. 
Alicia and Doug felt their relationship "was going well. 
They have similar interests, and Alicia described him as being a 
good communicator. Doug felt he was developing a good 
relationship with Alicia's children. He said he was a little 
nervous about having children, but he was looking forward to the 
challenge. 
Alicia felt she had been very liberal with visitation, 
especially during this past summer. After this current school 
year began, weekday visits were too disruptive, as the children 
weren't getting homework done. The schedule was changed so that 
Hark now has the children 2 1/2 weekends per month. Alicia said 
Marc has been pushing for more and more time with the children, 
and she saw some of his tactics as quite manipulative, for 
example, having the children call her to ask for more time. 
Alicia said she has been stressing the need for structure, and 
she denied any intention of wanting to hurt Marc or take the 
children from him, and she felt it was possible for Marc to spend 
extensive time with the-children even with her out of state. 
Alicia did not feel Marc really wants custody. She felt his 
real motive was to keep her from leaving the state. Alicia said 
she has offered Marc very lenient visitation, primarily during 
the summer months, but this has been unacceptable to Marc, and it 
would require him to use a day care provider, and he does not 
believe in day care. Instead, Marc is asking for the majority of 
his visitation during the school year, and he does not seem to be 
aware of how disruptive it would be for the children to attend 
two different schools each year. 
Alicia felt she should retain physical custody, as she has 
been the primary care giver, and she believed the children were 
more closely bonded to her. She also felt she was the better 
parent, as she is more aware of the children's needs, and when 
there is a problem, she handles it rather than ignoring it like 
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Hare. By getting married, she felt she would also create more of 
a family atmosphere for the children. She felt she should be 
allowed to move with the children, as she was creating a better 
life for them, and she felt the children, in the long run, would 
adjust better by not having to go back and forth between the two 
homes as frequently as they do now. 
Defendant: Marc reported that after separating, he 
rented a condominium, and approximately one 
year ago, he bought a three-bedroom condominium. He currently 
has his brother and his wife and three children living with him 
on a temporary basis while their home is being built. They plan 
on moving shortly after the first of the year. They are 
obviously cramped at this point, and when the children visit, 
they sleep wLth Marc. 
Marc has been self-employed since 1982 as a physical 
therapist. Kis business, Summit Sports Medicine, has offices in 
Salt Lake City and Park City, and his yearly income is $120,000. 
Marc said that at the time of the divorce, Alicia 
reluctantly agreed to joint legal custody. Marc said at the time 
he knew it wasn't reasonable for him to have, physical custody 
because of his work schedule, and he agreed to a very generous 
financial settlement based on the belief that Alicia wouldn't 
work, would stay home with the children, and would remain in the 
family home. However, she chose to disrupt the children by 
working and by moving the children from their home, and she now 
plans on further disrupting their lives by moving again and 
separating the children from their father. In addition, she no 
longer follows the standards of the LDS Church, which has been 
confusing to the children. 
Marc said that after the separation, he had liberal 
visitation "with the children, but since the beginning of the 
current school year, Alicia has been controlling about any 
visitation outside of the set schedule. He no longer takes the 
children during the week, but has the children an extra weekend 
day once a month. He has also been going.to the children's 
school to have lunch with them once a week. 
Marc's lifestyle centers around work and the children. In 
addition, he is active in the LDS Church. He has not dated for 
some time and currently has no social life, but he often sees 
members of his extended family. Marc said he feels depressed and 
lonely when the children are not with him. He was very sure that 
one day he would remarry. 
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Marc said Alicia notified him of her intention to move 
toward the end of October, 1332. Alicia was planning on moving 
in three weeks, and he decided to seek custody. Initially, they 
tried to work things out through a mediator, but this option 
failed. Marc said he did not want to take the children from 
Alicia, and what he would like is joint legal and physical 
custody. Alicia has proposed that he have visitation six weeks 
each summer, plus one to two weekends per month with extra time 
for holidays. Marc felt this arrangement was unacceptable, as he 
wants longer blocks of time with the children where he can be 
more involved in parenting. Marc has proposed that he have the 
children 5 1/2 months each year, January through June, and that 
during that time, Alicia could have the children one week in 
February for President's Day vacation, and one week in April for 
Spring breaks plus one to two weekends per month. 
Marc said that with his plan, the children wouldn't require 
any more child care than they currently have, and he would be 
able to work fewer hours during the time the children were with 
him. He said he has talked to school officials, and even though 
they did not see the situation as being ideal, they saw the plan 
as workable, and they have expressed a willingness to work with 
the school district in Corvalis. Marc said the children have 
experienced a lot of anxiety about moving, and Brandi's school 
counselor has said this was not a good time for her to move. 
Marc wondered why it was so important for Alicia to leave Utah 
and why Doug was not willing to move to Utah. 
Marc felt he should be granted joint legal and physical 
custody of the children, as the children need him, too. Ke said 
he wanted to be a parent to his children and not just a weekend 
father, and he felt he had much to offer them. Ke felt he could 
provide more stability and continuity for the children, and Marc 
saw himself as being more family oriented than Alicia, and he has 
extended family in Utah. He also stressed that he would raise 
the children in the LDS Church, whereas, he felt Alicia's 
lifestyle would confuse the children. 
IV. CHILDREN (To be kept strictly confidential from parents) 
The children were first interviewed at their mother's home 
on 12-16-32. 
Brandi reported feeling bad about her parents being 
divorced, and the worst part is not being atrle to live with both. 
Living with her mother has been "great.n She also likes to see 
her father. She felt she saw her father often enough, as "I 
already see him lots." 
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Anyie indicated Sue liked it at both homes . Both parents 
play with her, and her father takes her skiing, and her rrtcther 
takes her sleigh riding. Both parents expect her to help clean 
the house, cxndi for punishment, both spank her and send her to her 
room. Angie ielt her parents were equally likely to spend time 
with her, and she gets along with them equally well. She 
reported feeling as happy in one home as the other, and she 
reported feeling equally close to her parents. 
good relationship with Doug and 
happy about her mother marrying Doug and moving to Oregon. 
talk her into staying. 
U U L lie iid^ LIU L 
i ciibu l.n v. e.L v i eweu i-idiC ^ ^un iTOIii HIS liiSi m a r r i a g e , lid1 
16. Ha 11 ie i t n i s parents nad gotten a ir ng we 11 sinc e t h e 
.ivorce. He reported a good relationship with his 
father, and he has always maintained frequent contact. He fel^ 
his father had been really good about spending time with him ai 
giving hint attention. He comes to school programs, and 
_ i i _-_•.*____. *.. v.£ip vvith homework. He cares a 1 o 
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dS all riyht, jjui Ke i:dS never leiu ui jbe 
made us iee 1 11 Ke we lit i n . 
Bra n d i 
pressure she musz be fee1ing 
parent's custody battle. Prior to this incident and afterward, 
she seemed to be fine. Mo problems were observed in the other 
and they seemed to function about the same as they nad 
: _ x. i- t _ -nil _ r jk_i__ .. v. : i _i i _ A. _ J i i x. . x.u - .• .. 
. d n i t i • b . M i l u i Liie u i i i i u i e i i i e i d Leu w e i i LU L i i e i i . 
father and seemed to have a close and affectionate relationship 
v; i Lii ii i in . 
V . COLLATERAL INFOR; IATI OK* 
Erin Haucjli, one of-. Har'c's employees, said Hare ha^ a heart 
•r f gold and i s very people oriented. He handles stress well, anc 
ne has never :~, e^mt 
Mart is a very ambitious parent. He is very concerned about 
how the children look, and he goes the extra miie to make sure 
they are well c.-iied Lorr and in contrast to Alicia, he seems more 
c o n s c i e n t \ o i\ c , ; n c 
\( &-•-> \ 
I j d l t t U i i V b . b d i b U l l 
Page Thirteen 
example, when Alicia has the children, their socks don't alwa] 
match, and their clothes would be inside oui 
aiso tdiKeu dijout theii" mother giving their: : 
lor breakfast. During the marriage, it always seemed like he 
parenting, and he seemed to do a 
with the children. When Marc has the children, he expects them 
to mind, and they show him respect and have a close reiationshi; 
witii m m . Hare udS a lot of patience, and he has seemed more 
Al i c i a "was seen as di f f i cul t to get to know. She wou 1 d 
sometimes be very pleasant, and other days, she would ignore 
Erin. The house was always a mess, and once April said her 
r — * _ _ . . _ _ — i . T . ? U _ i _ _ 
. i U i l l i i U U b c w u i \ . Wi t t ? ' : r i i i t r C c i i i c 
:o the business to work out on the exercycle, she "would allow tl 
;hiiclren to run wild and bother Marc's patients, and she would 
to control them, leaving that up to Hare's 
_ . - - . - _ ' » _ _ _. - ._ -T : r J_ -u . - . * . . . • • » _t . _ _ ._ ._ a- _ _•» i_ _ A. A. _ ._ J_ i _ ._ _ i _ _ . . t j) 
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i cnore t hem . 
Cathy ?envore , a f r i end of Ilar c •' s , descr i bed h i m 
wonderful person wno everyj 
a nd h e cares dee p1y abou t his c h i1d r e n. 
t h e m o s t i m porta n t t h1n < 
He treats the children very well, and if he has to 
discipline them, he does it with kindness. During the marriage, 
he seemed very involved in child care, 
at work, 
He has been good about spending ouality time with th* 
and they have a close relationship with him. 
Cathy said she also likes Alicia, but she isn't a warm 
person like Marc. She is bright and talented, and when she set: 
her mind to do something, she will do it. The play to move awa'j 
was felt to be selfish, and at the time of the divorce, she 
seemed vindictive. At the time, she told Cathy that if Hare 
didn't give her what she wanted, he was going to need a passpor* 
to see the children. During the marriage, Alicia always seemed 
to be a good parent, and the children have always oeen very cior 
to her. In comparison to Marc, Alicia is more, rigid, and sue he 
Therefore, '*z was suspected that 
she wou1d have more trouble than Hare handling the children whei 
they reached aoolescence. 
Sheri Wright, a friend of Alicia's, uescribed her as car in*. 
and honest, and she has been very involved in community 
At one point, she spearheaded a community drive to get sidewalk 
and bike paths in for the sake of the children's safety. 
* \ ^ •-» 
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great pdreut. Sue i^ very 
On the children and iS aware of their needs, 
iie Cicing ano what is going on in their lives, and she takes th< 
time to listen and 1 earn. She is conscicutious and concerned aj 
has always provided good care. She plays with her children 
frequently, and she has been involved with them in girl scouts. 
She recognizes the importance of structure, consistency, and a 
legular schedule, and she does a good job with discipline and 
guidance. She teaches the children responsibility and gives th« 
choices. She helps them with school work. She isn't too stric 
or too lenient 
Marc was seen as genuine and unselfish, and a wonderful mai 
He is very honest, and he is not a malicious person. However, 1 
p i a y t n e v i c 11 rn r o 1 e . 
but he is a workaholic. Sheri said that at one time she iiV' 
with Marc and Alicia, and her work schedule was usually from 
6:00 a.m. Uut i i 7:30 to 3:00 p. iii. at n i g*ht. When he was at 
he watched a lot of a TV, and he left the majority of child 
rearing up to Alicia. He has had a tendency to forget to fo 
/dLUli L 
:hi ngs, 
lone things like taking the children down dangerous ski runs 
id i u l u v t i n i b I ' i i i i u i e n d u i e c i ! 
Ht 
K e h as had s ome strange ideas, f o r ex amp 1 e 
~olerate the idea, of having the children in day care. 
:ee1 Alicia was be i ng vindict i ve, i 
. i d v e u i L e i i u i m u L i v e b ; u v /d i iL iny t u i e d V t r u n i t . 
•Ancomf o r t ab1e 11ving in ?ark City since the divorce, because of 
gossip. She has wanted to leave since the time they separated. 
but she has stayed because of the children' 
Marc. 
Betty Kowa1syk, Brandi's schoo1 psycho 1og i st
 i 
Alicia perceive things very differently, ano ^ 
.oren, ano especially Brandi, seem 
a 1 ot of pres: 
:he chl iciren. Ovi^ was not seen as being more guilty than 
, 1her . Brandi has been hav i ng ao jus tmenn proo i ems , ano sn• 
.-;it : i ,\e a^jLj^j^y ii-ve-o nei . J. L wdb ^ubpt-.ru LUCIL r.iciiiu. 
: 11 i tucle may be a reflection of her mother ' 
*_ i _ i . _..'.i_i_ 
U d V e i U l i t i i V7 i L i i 
- _•» _* _ . _ _ • » _ r j _ _ 
M d i i U i , d i l U a i ' . t 
Sue has t a i K e o 
:e nas t o i o nim 
MdLlC 
u i i u i e n , 
h e WOU 1 u 
u u u L li i :-• 
*_ _ _ i - . — 
:i<ib u e e n 
and t h i s 
seem more 
p i" o p o s e c 
c om i n g t o t h e s c h o o 1 t o 
has bee n c! i s i* u p 11 v e t z 
v e g i" e s s e o . S e t t y s a i c 
CUStOOV S C u e O U i e , cu'id S 
rW2> 
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L d i b U l l V b . L i d J - i ^ U l l 
? a g e F i f t e e n 
SOiue iitd j OI" p i*ob i emS W'i t h i t . T h e yi 1 n c 1 p i 1 
t o t : i 
response was that he just wanted to knov* i f 
out. He was, told yes, but he was also told there "would be majoi 
problems in trying to work out such a schedule. 
a friend of'Alicia's, described her as 
extremeiy orignt creative, responsible, and she has a lot oi 
energy. She deals with reality very well, and there is no 
indication of psychological problems. 
Alicia was felt to be a good parent. She provides good ca: 
and is very at tent i ve. If the ch i1dren need someth i ng, Alicia 
will drop what she is doing to attend to their 
_ _"» _ : _ • » _ — JT _ " » - • _ _ . • i : _ ; . _ _ .±_ i_ _ _ t_ .* •» _i _ _ j _ \_ _ 
y U U L j U J J D i U l h C l p i H ! i l ! U L i i e C i l i l U I t f l l , — ; ' U ^ i i e 
struct u r e a n d 1i m its T»«;h i c h t h ey n e e d 
anci they are very close 
seem to JJe wei i adjusted. 
Sherry Baltz, a former neighbor, saw Marc as being solid and 
oepenoabie, ano ne has always been an attentive parent. Sherry 
.._ _ i 
Ale : 
marriage, but he has always done things 
has been committed to his family. The c m 1dren are all very 
loving ano ciose to Hare, and when he has them, he seems to take 
very good care of them. He does a good job of disciplining, and 
the children mind him well. He has not been the type of parent 
vjho i gnor es prob 1 ems, and when he deals w 11h m i sbehav i or , he dce s 
it in a pos i t i ve manner. 
Alicia's heart is in the right place, but her style is more 
f 1 a mb oy a n t wh en she does t h i ng s w i t h the children, wh er e a s Mar c 
just does quality things with the children without the fanfare. 
In comparison to Marc, she does not seem to be as stable. Sue is 
more focused on herself, and she tends to be aloof and in her ovrn 
Her persoudl life has more ups dud dovjn^ bince ^he ano 
Marc separateo, ano sue nas ueen iess responsiuie. ror example, 
Sherry said her daughter tended for Alicia in the past, and she 
had a hard time getting home at the appoii 
Jeff Larson, Marc's brother, said he was unsure of Alicia's 
current parenting, but in the past, she was a gooo and caring 
parent. However, she tends to be self-centered, and she 
overreacts and yells at the children when upset. Since the 
separation, she has stopped going to church, and seems to no 
longer provide religious training, and it appears as though she 
has relied a lot upon others to provide child care. It also 
appears as though she has been using the children as a weapon 
against iiarc, and she has been controlling about the children's 
,u rv-nA-
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has also been devoted to his children and has spent 
1 i ty tune with thein as possible. During the marriage, 
ot of responsibility for child '.rearlay since the 
"y iiiiiCa s h o w n h i s a b i 1 i t " / t o 
-e a*au tne caiiciren have a very clost-
ijood job with guidance and discipline. Hare is willing to oo 
whatever is necessary to meet the children's needs including 
granted custody. He has 
iepdirat i on, and h a t ver~> U'. 
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I la r e j 
r e a r r a n g i ng h i s bchedu 1 e i I "~~ *^~ *• -^A - ••••'•- *• ~ 
: u U'UGL L ^ y t> L em 
*J * UUl 
a n i b ^ d i s i i i y d a u w i L a l e a u v , ' ^ u o L u u i i : i mtauueJL ^ . 
Brand i w"db i . e . t O b e a d V i a u d d 1 U b t 1 a C 
ea.b 
ii i c id announced hei 
di lX 1 OUS 
c1ingy, and Iei gns illnebs to 
-.-•? 1-..-.-.- pi^Q^ to move, all 
- . . - I -i_ _ _ _ _ • » _ i _ o _ _ r 
d i l ' L u 1 
: r cb 1 euib . 
no nave e x p r e s s e d concerns aocu 
:>ae 
» _ • > _ _ _ _ 
iidvt; u e ea. 
ltd'1 
their bchool and friendb. 
M i . C I d b illULiltJi 
>arent . She has always been the primary care giver 
.*as always gone from home with his business. The c 
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Parent inappropriately piebsuriny the children, bill 
sensitive and want to please both parents. 
to bUCjciestions, and bhe has done 
r esponded 
children to express their feelings. She is sensitive to the 
ch i 1 or en ' s needs , i nc I ud i ng the i mpor tanc e of them in a 1 n t a i n i no 
their r e1 a 11on ship with their father. 
r U b l D L i i j J ! 
t u n e n L 
Recen11y Allcia announced that she p1 ai 
delaying her move to Oregon until June 
year ends. 
O U Ml••l/\tl I r\LV L) rv.Z»U L.» Ml-llJlM U M 1 J. UIMO 
rsy l i i b i u i y Alicia ha.b been the primary care giv* 
during the marriage and since the time of the separat. 
iLdb : : e i w e a r ^ n e b b e b 
U d i . e i i L 1 11U LI 
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.• V e 1 c< 
- r 
ch i 1d reu and meet i ng t h e i r 
. L l i i i e i . 
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Marc nas been an excellent provider, and he has recognized 
potential custodial parent due to the 
However, Marc has good basic parenting 
Ljl d i i L e u L i l t ? , 7 i i e i tJW 1 w l i d i. L : i e L-?L:L,i3.r 
and meet t he c h i l d r e n i ieedb. 
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It S h o u l d be noted, though, that 
Marc's desire for custody is of short duration, and he seems more 
concerned about having frequent contact with the children rather 
than actually wanting custody. His custody suit is viewed as 
more of an attempt to prevent Alicia from moving from the area. 
However, if he is not able to accomplish this goal, he is very 
sensitive in his desire to have joint physical custody, as he is 
v e ry interest ed i n ma i nt a i n i ng a ina j or ro 1 e i n the ch 11 dr enf s 
1 i v e s . 
Both Alicia and Marc are felt to be capable of raising tue 
children and having physical custody. Both v/i 11 require 
v.r,+. ; j. ^^  not entirely clear which parenl surrogate care, out
Ube i L m e iaui L . noun paren Lb seem L O nave quite a oi U i. 
f "» -* i _ : •» : J 
surroQ"ate c a 
and during the bchool yecir, the quebtioi 
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more surrogate care 
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••conomi c s e t t 
them t he mos t du r i n g 
school . Conce rn ing f i n a n c e s , i^oti 
t h e q u e b t i on o f wh: 
vi11 most 1 i k e l y be 
t h e b-uminer months when t h e y 
p d l ^ U L b O l J V l L U b i V 
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psychology c a 1 o i s t u c •/. 
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about Alicia's lifestyle, given her and Marc's LD3 background. 
Their previous joint commitment to their religious ideas and 
values implies an understanding rhat the children would be raise 
with the same values and ideals, and Alicia's change of lifestyl 
is potentially confusing to the children. Obviously, Marc's 
religious beliefs and lifestyle is more compatible with the way 
Idren have be« 
1ive in Utah, 
ildren to maintain their relationships. 
However, on the other hand, Alicia offers the children the 
advantage of a two-parent household. 
The children have a good relationship with both parents 
is assumed that since they have been living v/ith their mothe: 
that they would-be more closely bonded to her. However, bas*; 
the children's report, if they are more closely 
minimal. The children have struggled v/ith 
the idea of moving to Oregon, and at this point, they seem to 
accept the idea that they will be living there with their mother 
has been the primary care giver, has had 
physical custody and has done a reasonably good job in these 
uoles, I do not believe there is sufficient reason to chanae 
cu^ tody 
Ideally, Alicia wou1d remain in the State of Ut, 
the children to maintain frequent contact v/ith their 
to reconsider her move and to explore the 
possibility of having her fiance move to Utah. However, I 
recognize the complexities of modern life and understand that 
th i s may not be poss i b1e. 
If Alicia follows through with her planned move to Orego: 
physical custody should be contingent upon: I) 
not living together without the benefit of marriage, and 
chi1dren bei ng ra i sed i n the LDS re 1i g i on. 
Marc should be granted liberal visitation so long as 
not interfere with the children's scuooiinc. 
circumstances should the children transfer to the Park City 
School D.istr'ict for part of the school year to accommodate Marc 
visitation. Hare should have visitation a minimum of six to 
e i g ht we e k s each s umm e r a n d 
vacation, to begin one year at the start oi Curistmas vacaiion. 
and on alternate years on December 26. In addition, Marc shoulu 
be granted visitation for the duration ot ^3.a\ Spring oreari. 
(4 p \ " ^ 
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KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICIA LARSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
MARC LARSON, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 10958 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial 
on April 15, 1993, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by her counsel, John Sheaffer, and defendant was present and represented by his 
counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court heard the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and 
heard arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 
makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on April 29, 1992. 
2. The decree provided that plaintiff and defendant would have joint legal custody of 
heir three minor children, Brandy, April, and Angie. Plaintiff was awarded primary physical 
No. . . . 
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custody and defendant was awarded nehts of visitation. The decree further provided that each 
party would cooperate in fostering and maintaining the other party's relationship and parental 
role with the children and that the parties would jointly participate in making decisions 
concerning the children's upbringing. 
3. In October of 1992, plaintiff informed defendant that she intended to move, with 
the three children, to Corvalis, Oregon. 
4. Plaintiff has been the primary caregiver for the parties' minor children, but 
defendant has had a significant, active, open involvement in their lives. Defendant has fulfilled a 
traditional role in the children's lives; that is, he is the bread winner, and plaintiff has been the 
person designated to raise the children. 
5. Notwithstanding that plaintiff has been the primary caregiver, the children are 
nearly equally bonded to both parents. Defendant is extremely committed to his children and 
wishes to continue to be involved in their lives. 
6. Plaintiff and defendant are each excellent parents. Each is equally capable of 
caring for the children. 
7. At best, it is speculative whether a move to Corvalis, Oregon would be successful 
or permanent. In the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in Corvalis, 
Oregon, and plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry. However, Mr. 
Pomeroy and plaintiff have not yet married and there is a potential for conflict if the family were 
to move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to Corvalis, Oregon would enhance the 
children's educational environment, nor plaintiffs career potential. It is a high risk move for 
plaintiff and the children. 
0 0 9 2 1 * 
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8. Defendant has exercised all visitation that has been allowed by plaintiff and has 
sought additional visitation. He has been involved in the children's school and has been an 
attentive, caring parent. 
9. The children do not wish to move to Corvalis, Oregon. 
10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, recommended that the children 
remain in the physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in his report that it would be in the 
children's best interests to remain in Utah and reading his report as a whole, it is clear that the 
recommendation was a close call. The present custodial arrangements have fostered happy well-
adjusted lives for the children. 
11. Although there are no defects in plaintiffs capacity or willingness to function as a 
parent, there is some question about plaintiffs stability because of her several changes of 
residence during the year since the entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
12. Both parents have an equal depth of and long term desire for custody. The father 
has shown a commitment to the children. 
13. Defendant would provide personal care for the children by reducing the hours that 
he works and would also be required to provide some surrogate care. 
14. During the marriage, both parents and the children attended the LDS Church and 
were active in the LDS Church. Since the separation of the parties, plaintiff has ceased to be 
active in the LDS Church. Defendant remains active and wishes to keep the children active in 
the LDS Church. The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to Corvalis, 
Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training. 
15. The majority of the children's extended family, including aunts, uncles, and 
cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah. Defendant's children from his prior marriage, half-
sister and half-brother to these children, also live in Utah. These children have an excellent 
OOcfelo. fc^v 
relationships with their older half-sister and half-brother. They lave many friends and 
connections in Utah. 
16. A move to Corvalis, Oregon is not in the children's best interests; it is in the best 
interests of the children to remain in Summit County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to continue to 
reside in Summit County, the children will remain primarily in her physical custody. If, 
however, plaintiff determines to move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical custody of the 
children should be transferred to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal visitation. 
17. Plaintiff did not keep defendant informed of the development of her plans to 
move, or has not kept defendant fully advised of the children's activities in school. Each party 
should be admonished to keep the other fully informed about the children's activities and welfare. 
48. Plaintiff has not shown a need for assistance with payment of her attorney's fees. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes and enters the following: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The petition for modification of the decree of divorce should be granted. The 
parties should maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff determines to 
reside in Summit County, Utah, she should retain primary physical custody of the children and 
defendant's visitation shall remain as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff 
decides to move from Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children should be 
transferred to defendant, and plaintiff should have reasonable and liberal visitation. 
2. Each party should bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein. 
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DATED this _J£day of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, on the ^ d a y of 
June, 1993: 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KJRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation °" "' "'' •-
Attorneys for Defendant M L E D 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway JUL 2 6 1993 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 c w \ o» &«»«»» coumy 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICIA LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARC LARSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 10958 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial 
on April 15, 1993, pursuant to notice. The Honorable David S. Young presided. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., and defendant was present and 
represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court having heard the testimony of witnesses, 
received exhibits, heard arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
as follows: 
BOQffppwir 00-7 Gr-fcA-
1. Defendant's petition for modification of the decree of divorce is granted. The 
parties shall maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff resides in Summit 
County, Utah, she shall retain primary physical custody of the children and defendant's visitation 
shall continue as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff decides to move from 
Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children shall be transferred to defendant, and 
plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable and liberal visitation. 
2. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein. 
DATED this / j £ d ^ of ^vJ^^ , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, on the^f day of 
June, 1993: 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2167 
l ^ ^ ^ 
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JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930) 
DART, ADAMSON St DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-216"7 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
No. 
FILED" 
JUL 12 1933 
Clerk of Summit County 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
ALICIA LARSON 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARC LARSON, 
Defendant. 
oOo 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 10958 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Alicia Larson, and hereby 
objects to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by 
plaintiff in the above-entitled action resulting from trial before 
the Court on April 15, 1993 as follows for the reasons hereinbelow 
stated: 
1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed 
by defendant fail to incorporate the Court's specific findings that 
the relationship between the plaintiff and her fiancee are 
irrelevant to the best interests of the children unless it enhances 
the relationship with the defendant, and the Court does not so 
ft~fcU> 
find. See Transcript of Ruling (hereinafter "Transcript") at 
page 5, lines 10-13, a copy of which is attached hereto. 
2, The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed 
by defendant fail to incorporate the Court's specific findings 
that there is no defect in plaintiff's moral character or emotional 
stability. See Transcript at page 6, lines 6-11. 
3. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed 
by defendant fail to incorporate the Court's specific finding that 
plaintiff will likely decline to move to Corvallis, Oregon, based 
on her testimony. See Transcript at page 8, lines 20-25. 
DATED this / V ^ day of July, 1993. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
/^ /JOHN D. SHEAFFER,~ ^ PL / 6> 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
qdx 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the M ^"^ day 
of July, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection 
to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was faxed and 
mailed to: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IRENE M. CLATRK 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. 10958 
TITLE: ( • P a r t i e s 
ALICIA LARSON 
VS 
MARC LARSON 
Present ) COUNSEL: ( • C o u n s e l P r e s e n t ) 
' JOHN D. SHEAFFER. JR. 
310 SOUTH MAIN ST, STE 1330 
•
:
 SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84101-2167 
." ELLEN MAYCOCK 
. 8TH FL, VALLEY TOWER 
. 50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
• 
JOYE D. OVARD 
CLERK 
ED MIDGLEY
 HQN. DAVID S. YOUNG 
REPORTER JUDGE 
TODD HIXSON
 D A T E . JULY 15, 1993 
BAILIFF 
COURT'S RULING: 
The Court being fully advised in the premises hereby denies Plaintiff's Objections 
and enters Defendant's Order this 15th day of July 1993. 
COPIES MAILED TO COUNSEL 8-25-93 .JO 
£>,-^"V PAGE OF 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (293 0) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
m i * 1993 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
No. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
C i v i l No . 10958 
F I L E D 
AUG 24 1993 
Clerk of Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT By ~...JU 
Deputy CWk 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
ALICIA LARSON 
Plaintiff, 
MARC LARSON, 
Defendant. 
oOo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Alicia Larson, and by and 
through her attorney undersigned hereby appeals to the Utah Court 
of Appeals the decision and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah, on July 26, 1993, and further hereby 
provides notice of the filing of a cash bond in the sum of $300.00 
with the clerk of the above-entitled Court to insure payment of 
costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. , 
DATED this ?Ji ^-day of August, 1993. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
O 
By /l/C^-//JOHN D~ SHEAFFER, # R / f 
i / Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
ft-AO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the ZM—day 
of August, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal was hand-delivered, to: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IRENE M 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights-] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office-] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of 
public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompe-
tent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. 
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate 
the State or interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in 
this Constitution. 
ft-A'L 
30-3-3. Award ojf costs, attorney and witness 
fees — Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, 
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of cus-
tody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a 
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the ac-
tion. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of prop-
erty in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the rea-
son for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court 
may order a party to provide money, during the pen-
dency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in 
the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry 
of the final order or judgment may be amended dur-
ing me course oi tne action or in the final order or 
judgment. 1993 
rW*2> 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion — Meritorious petition for modifi-
/i» u,u C a t \ ° n l E f f e c t i v e untii January 1, 19941. 
u) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties The 
d^rce i n d U d e t h C f ° U 0 W i n g i n e V e ^ d e c r e € o f 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
cnlt M n e r a g e i s a v a i 1 l a b l e * a reasonable 
cost an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
Ul^care insurance for <he dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party U re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(u) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the courts division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
' (3 ) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and de-
nied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the 
petition was without merit and not asserted or de-
fended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
. with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or 
other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor-
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation. 1W3 
Disposition of property — Mainte-
nance and health care of parties and 
children — Division of debts — Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of 
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification [Effective January 1, 
19941. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
payment oi iw«..»-.v ^ 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a rea-
sonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; 
and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued 
or modified on or after January 1 ,1994 , that are 
subject to income withholding, an order assessing 
against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount 
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices within the Department of Human Services 
for the purposes of income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
<2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and de-
nied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing 
oartv in that action, if the court determines that the 
petition was without merit and not asserted or de-
fended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or 
other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor-
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation. 1993 
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30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the.past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds tha t one parent does not desire 
custody of the child, or has attempted to permanently 
relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that 
evidence into consideration in determining whether 
to award custody to the other parent. 1993 
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30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final 
order of joint legal custody is entered when the plain-
tiff has filed an action in the judicial district as de-
fined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is 
administered as provided under Section 30-3-11.3, 
both parties shall attend the mandatory course and 
present a certificate of completion from the course to 
the court. 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide 
terms the court determines appropriate, which may 
include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, 
until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange informa-
tion concerning the health, education, and wel-
fare of the child, and where possible, confer be-
fore making decisions concerning any of these 
areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regard-
ing the child's present and future physical care, 
support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the 
child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine, and his association with 
friends; and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental 
rights, privileges, duties, and powers to be exer-
cised by the parents solely, concurrently, or 
jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the 
order the terms agreed to between the parties. 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed 
by the court order may be exercised by the parent 
having physical custody of the child the majority of 
the time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians 
does not impair or limit the authority of the court 
to order support of the child, including payments 
by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is 
not grounds for modifying a support order. 
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute reso-
lution procedure the parties agree to use before 
seeking enforcement or modification of the terms 
and conditions of the order of joint legal custody 
through litigation, except in emergency situa-
tions requiring ex parte orders to protect the 
child. 
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